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Campaign Individualisation before and
after the Bailout: A Comparison
between Greece and Portugal
Marco Lisi and Jose´ Santana-Pereira
The elections that took place in Greece and Portugal before and after the intervention of
the so-called Troika allow us to examine to what extent the austerity period has affected
the nature and style of electoral campaigns, especially in terms of individualisation. Our
results show that campaigns in Greece and Portugal were quite different and that Greek
candidates supported by the two main parties are more likely to emphasise their role. Yet
the short-term impact of the crisis has been negligible, as there have been insignificant
shifts in the communicative focus on the personalisation of the agendas and on the means
used in the campaign after the intervention of the Troika.
Keywords: Electoral Campaigns; Campaign Individualisation; Troika; Economic Crisis;
Greece; Portugal
The personalisation of politics is one of the main transformations experienced by
contemporary democracies over the last decades. With the declining relevance of social
cleavages, the fading of partisan attachments and the crisis of party organisations,
individual politicians play a fundamental role in representative democracies, for
example, in structuring the vote, citizen mobilisation and decision-making
mechanisms (McAllister 1996; Aarts, Blais & Schmitt 2012; Helms 2012). By and
large, the increasing levels of anti-party sentiments are a powerful incentive to
downsize the importance of party organisation to the detriment of individual
personalities (Farrell 2006).
Within this background of significant changes that contemporary democracies are
experiencing, this article aims to explore to what extent and in what type of context
candidates may play a more autonomous role in election campaigns. Although the
concept of the ‘candidate-centred’ campaign has been widely used in the United States
(US) context (Wattenberg 1991), it has been largely neglected in the European context.
Until now the literature has assumed European parties centralise their campaigns in
both organisational and communicational strategy terms. However, as some authors
q 2014 Taylor & Francis
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have shown (Zittel & Gschwend 2008; Karlsen & Skogerbø 2013), these two
components are not necessarily related to each other and can vary separately.
Existing research has shown there is a lot of variation in campaign strategies,
especially when we consider the different components that lie behind the style of
electioneering. Besides individual factors, this variation has been associated mainly
with institutional factors (Giebler & Wessels 2013). Yet this research has neglected the
role other contextual factors may play on campaign characteristics. As highlighted in
the introduction to this special issue, the financial crisis has caused important changes
in terms of attitudes towards representatives, party mobilisation and electoral
alignments (Freire et al. 2014). As a consequence, the Eurozone crisis may also affect
campaign strategies and the way election campaigns are conducted.
This article examines candidate campaigns by focusing on Greek and Portuguese
elections. Our starting point is the theoretical distinction between individualised
versus party-centred campaigns (Plasser & Plasser 2002; Karlsen & Skogerbø 2013).
We believe these conceptual tools deserve to be empirically investigated, particularly
with regard to the influence that short-term factors exert on the type and style of
election campaigns. The analysis of campaign strategies in Greece and Portugal allows
us to examine to what extent extreme changes in economic conditions affect
their characteristics. In this article we focus on the two largest parties in each country
with recent experience in government and/or with expectations of forming a
government after the election. We believe that for such parties the effect of context in
the campaign strategies may be paramount, owing both to their historical record
(all have governed these countries in the last decade) and to their nature (catch-all,
ideologically diffuse).
Relative to previous studies on campaign strategies, the contribution of this paper is
twofold. First, it aims to examine whether and how campaign strategies and styles
change over time. In particular, it aims to explore whether a huge external shock, such
as the bailouts in Greece and Portugal, has affected candidate campaigns, or whether
the main characteristics of election campaigns have remained stable regardless of the
important challenges brought about by the economic crisis. Second, by comparing two
different countries, the article seeks to evaluate the relative impact of individual
determinants across distinct institutional and short-term contextual settings. In doing
this, our contribution speaks not only to the literature on election campaigns but also
to the debate about party organisational change and recent trends in political
representation.
The following section briefly reviews the literature on individualised campaigns and
derives the main hypotheses to be tested. The subsequent section deals with data and
methods. The fourth section analyses both longitudinal and cross-national variations
in terms of candidate campaigns. The fifth elaborates the multivariate model used to
test the main determinants of campaign individualisation. The final section
summarises the findings and discusses its implications for the role played by political
parties and the challenges experienced by contemporary democracies.
542 M. Lisi and J. Santana-Pereira
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Campaign Individualisation and Financial Crisis
The debate on the personalisation of politics has argued that candidate characteristics
and performance are of increasing importance for voting behaviour, media coverage
and party platforms (McAllister 2007; Adam &Maier 2010; Kriesi 2012; Aarts, Blais &
Schmitt 2012). While the processes of modernisation and professionalisation have
encouraged the centralisation of electioneering and party-centred campaigns,
dramatic changes in political communication tools have increasingly emphasised
the figure of the individual politician. This personalisation may involve not only party
leaders but also individual candidates. As a consequence, there is now more variation
in terms of campaign strategies and instruments (Giebler & Wessels 2013).
As several authors have noted, during election campaigns individual candidates
may attempt to increase their autonomy and visibility among voters, mobilising their
own resources and developing different strategies. Zittel and Gschwend (2008) have
described this phenomenon through the concept of ‘individualised campaigns’, which
means that candidates seek a personal vote on the basis of a candidate-centred
organisation, candidate-centred campaign agenda and candidate-centred means of
campaigning. Karlsen and Skogerbø (2013), on the other hand, distinguish between
two dimensions: the communicative focus and the organisational strategy.
Individualised campaigns are related to the first dimension, whereas the second
aspect is associated with the degree of campaign centralisation. By and large, these
studies have found that even where institutional features favour the adoption of
centralised party-based campaigns – namely in proportional representation systems –
we can still find some degree of candidate personalisation.
While the organisational component is certainly a significant aspect of
individualised campaigns, it is also important to take into account candidate
perceptions of their role in election campaigns. According to Zittel and Gschwend
(2008), this is the ‘normative’ component of candidate individualisation, which
should complement the analysis of the objective dimension: that is, the use of personal
political communication tools. Following these authors, we add a third dimension: the
raising of local and specific issues by candidates. We believe this can give us a more
complete picture of candidate campaign strategies and styles.
To the best of our knowledge, there are few longitudinal studies. The case of Israel
confirms the trend towards increasing levels of personalisation, although this change
happened at both the national and the local level, stimulating both the role and
visibility of party candidates (Balmas et al. 2014). The authors formulate the concept
of a ‘decentralised campaign’, meaning there is increasing personalisation of a group of
individuals who are not party or executive leaders (Balmas et al. 2014). However, when
they discuss the empirical evidence supporting this new concept, they emphasise the
growing importance of the personal vote or the greater visibility candidates have
gained through the adoption of party primaries. While decentralised personalisation
may be a useful concept, especially when associated with the study on constituency
campaigns, the way these authors employ the concept overlaps to a large extent – at
South European Society and Politics 543
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least in terms of its behavioural component – with the concept of individualised
campaigns. The use of decentralised personalisation may be misleading when we
examine candidate campaigns, so in this article we prefer to use the terms
‘individualised campaigns’ or ‘candidate personalisation’. In light of this discussion,
the impact candidates have on voting behaviour will not be considered here.
According to previous research, campaigns in newer Southern European
democracies are relatively personalised and centralised (Pasquino 2001).
In Portugal, previous research has found that individual candidates focus their
campaign on their respective party and that they depend heavily on the resources
offered by party organisations (Lisi 2011, 2013). Based on a candidate survey
conducted during the 2009 elections, this research suggests election campaigns in
Portugal display a high level of centralisation and that prospective deputies mainly use
traditional tools of political communication. In addition, the focus of communication
is clearly based on party organisations, while candidate campaigns present a relatively
low level of professionalisation, as shown by the use of external consultants, campaign
budgets and planning. Finally, candidates play a marginal role in the mobilisation of
citizens at the local level and make limited use of new information technologies, two
features conventionally associated with post-modern campaigns (Seiceira 2011).
In Greece, party campaigns are also highly centralised and competition takes place
mainly at the national level. Papathanassopoulos (2000, p. 54) has argued that, since
the 1996 elections, parties have increasingly controlled candidate strategies, especially
with regard to their appearance in television programmes. Television-centred
campaigning has also been detrimental to mobilisation based on candidate activities at
the local level. As for the use of new information technologies, studies on web
campaigning in the 2004 elections found that only a small proportion of candidates
made use of this communication tool, leading the authors to conclude that Greek
campaigns were still characterised by features associated with traditional campaigns
(Lappas, Chatzopoulos & Yannas 2008; Mylona 2008). Moreover, the use of the
Internet was inversely associated with political experience and party ranking,
candidates holding government positions or with a senior party rank being more likely
to use traditional tools.
Several factors may account for this high level of centralisation. First, candidate
recruitment largely depends on national party bodies, while the party leadership
controls the careers of candidates and deputies. Second, the mass media tend to focus
on the main party leaders, especially those who compete for government. Third, in
both Portugal and Greece party funding is based on public subsidies, and corporate
donations to parties or candidates are prohibited. This regulation strengthens the
power of parties compared with candidates. Finally, it is also important to consider
that the proportional representation system favours party-centred campaigns, thus
enhancing the role of party leaders over candidates.
The literature indicates that the degree of campaign individualisation depends,
on the one hand, on personal and political background and, on the other, on party
characteristics. In terms of the former, incumbents are more likely to have more
544 M. Lisi and J. Santana-Pereira
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resources at their disposal than first-time prospective candidates (Zittel & Gschwend
2008). Empirical studies also show that gender has a significant impact on the style of
candidate campaign, men being more prone to personalise their own campaigns than
women (Karlsen & Skogerbø 2013).
As for intra-party variation, one important dimension traditionally associated with
election campaigns is the type of recruitment used. According to the literature (Carey
& Shugart 1995; Giebler & Wessels 2013), more decentralised modes of candidate
selection are more prone to lead to individualised campaigns. Finally, it is plausible
also to distinguish between party ideologies, left-wing candidates being more likely to
engage in a low level of individualised campaigning (Karlsen & Skogerbø 2013).
This brief literature review shows that the impact of the context on the type of
candidate campaign is clearly a neglected topic of research. Some studies have already
shown that campaign styles and goals may depend on the institutional setting (Giebler
& Wu¨st 2011; Giebler & Wessels 2013). Yet there is no research focusing on the impact
different political environments have on campaign personalisation. The economic
crisis has significantly hit both Greece and Portugal: the former had to ask for two
bailouts between 2010 and 2012, while the latter entered into financial default in April
2011, leading to the fall of the socialist government and the calling of new legislative
elections (held on 5 June that year).
The external intervention of the so-called Troika (of the International Monetary
Fund [IMF], European Commission [EC] and European Central Bank [ECB]) has had
important political, economic and social consequences. In particular, recent studies
have examined the effects of the economic crisis on electoral behaviour (Kosmidis
2014; Magalha˜es 2014), party performance (Bosco & Verney 2012) and political
attitudes (Bartels & Bermeo 2014). Yet this strand of research has mainly examined
political changes from the citizens’ point of view, while party strategies have largely
been neglected. We believe the Greek and Portuguese cases are well suited to an
analysis of candidate campaigns in different contexts, not only because of the
significant impact of the economic crisis but also because of some important
institutional differences. This cross-country and longitudinal variation allows us to
understand whether campaign styles and goals are the same across different settings.
What are the main expectations concerning the impact of the economic crisis on
candidate campaigns? Taking into account the potential effect of the economic crisis
on campaign strategies, we argue that the intervention and constraints set by
international lenders are likely to foster more individualised campaigns. First, with
austerity programmes decided by foreign actors, it becomes more andmore difficult to
distinguish between party programmes and election platforms (Enyedi 2014). Second,
one of the effects of the economic crisis is to reveal crises in party organisations,
especially in terms of public opinion. Although disillusionment with parties is a long-
term phenomenon, and the increase in negative views of parties is a well-documented
trend, several studies have shown that the economic and financial crisis that affected
southern Europe has served as a catalyst to the growing distance between parties and
citizens (Jalali 2014; Lisi 2014). We believe the combination of increasing popular
South European Society and Politics 545
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discontent with parties (especially with governing parties) and the difficulties of the
main parties in responding to the challenges posed by the crisis and in being
responsive to their electoral basis is likely to change campaign strategies by
emphasising the role of candidates to the detriment of party organisations.
When we analyse the 2011 Portuguese and the 2012 Greek elections, we should
notice that the perceptions and conditions associated with the economic crisis were
profoundly different. While in Greece two bailouts had already been implemented and
their social, economic and political effects were evident, in the Portuguese case when
the 2011 elections took place it was still unclear how deep the austerity measures
would be and how long they would remain in place. Consequently, our first hypothesis
states that the economic crisis is expected to foster more individualised campaigns; we
also expect Greek candidates to display stronger effects stemming from the crisis.
Our second hypothesis concerns the institutional setting. In these two quite
centralised settings we nevertheless expect higher levels of campaign individualisation
in Greece than in Portugal. Several theoretical reasons underlie this expectation.
First, according to a consolidated strand of research, the crucial variable affecting
candidate incentives to organise and execute their own campaign strategy and
mobilise more personalised resources is related to the characteristics of the electoral
system. In particular, proportional systems are supposed to foster more centralised
campaigns and increase national coordination and the vertical structure of campaign
organisation (Bowler & Farrell 1992; Swanson & Mancini 1996; Farrell 2002). Some
case studies on European countries seem to confirm that campaigns are more
centralised in proportional systems (Plasser & Plasser 2002; Karlsen & Skogerbø 2013).
In terms of their electoral systems, Greece and Portugal are remarkably different.
Although both countries have a proportional system of representation, Greece has
three distinct tiers while Portugal has just one. Overall, the Greek electoral system is
significantly more disproportional than the Portuguese. The average district
magnitude is 5.4 for Greece and 10.5 for Portugal, while the effective threshold is
11.7 for the former compared with 6.5 for the latter (Gallagher &Mitchell 2008; Freire,
Moreira & Martins 2008). Moreover, if we consider that in Greece a legal barrier of
three per cent is in place and that there was a majority prize of 40 seats (which
increased to 50 seats with the 2008 electoral reform), the differences between the two
countries are even more manifest.
Another important feature of the electoral system which may affect the degree of
individualised campaigns is the type of ballot. Carey and Shugart (1995) pioneered
this strand of research by examining how different characteristics of the electoral
system affect the incentive to cultivate a personal vote. According to their
contribution, the effect of district magnitude interacts with the ballot structure. As the
magnitude increases, candidates are more likely to run personalised campaigns when
voters may express their preference. By contrast, in closed list systems the relationship
is exactly the opposite: only candidates at the top of the list are supposed to emphasise
their personality, because in this context the use of personal resources is an instrument
for securing selection by party leaders. Empirical findings seem to confirm this
546 M. Lisi and J. Santana-Pereira
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interaction, showing that the capacity of candidates to mobilise (illegal) resources
depends on both district magnitude and ballot type (Chang & Golden 2007). Also, in
terms of ballot structure there are remarkable differences between Greece and
Portugal. In Greece, electors cast a vote for between one and five candidates on a
constituency list, depending on the number of seats, while in Portugal the vote is based
on closed party lists and voters only have to choose from the political parties.
Beyond the characteristics of the electoral system, Greek and Portuguese campaigns
are expected to diverge in terms of individualised campaigns due to the different
degree of state centralisation. Several studies have shown (Lundell 2004; Bolleyer
2011), the administrative structure affects the characteristics of party organisation as
well as the process of candidate selection. Consequently, it is plausible to expect that
the higher the level of decentralisation, the more likely it is candidates will run
personalised campaigns. Portugal is one of the most centralised countries in Europe, as
is shown by the index of regional authority (Hooghe, Marks & Schakel 2008); in
contrast, Greece is relatively more decentralised, receiving a score of 10 (on a scale
from zero to 20, ranging frommore to less centralisation), while the figure for Portugal
is 3.7. Therefore, based on the literature on the impact of the electoral system and state
centralisation on candidate personalisation, we expect that, all other things being
equal, Greek candidates will present a greater level of personalisation than their
Portuguese counterparts.
Our third hypothesis concerns the specific status of the party supporting the
candidates during the campaign. The economic crisis may have distinct effects on party
and candidate strategies depending on their institutional position. We know that in
‘hard-times elections’ incumbents compete with the goal of avoiding being blamed for
the difficult situation (Magalha˜es 2014). In addition, Vavreck (2009) has noticed that
candidate strategy depends on the context, especially in terms of economic
performance. When the economic situation is good, leaders are more likely to focus
on this topic; but when the economic performance is negative they prefer to focus on
more consensual issues. During economic crises, incumbent parties are more likely to
not focus on the national party leaders’ performance in order to avoid being punished
by voters. From this viewpoint, it is plausible to expect that candidates from incumbent
parties will run more personalised campaigns than those from the main opposition
parties. Therefore, our third hypothesis is that the emergence of the economic crisis is
likely to reinforce the individualised campaigns of incumbent parties compared with
those of the opposition. In other words, we expect the status of the party will have a
greater impact after than before the bailouts. However, the formation of a technocratic
government supported by a grand coalition of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement
(PASOK; Pan1llh´nio Sosialistiko´ Ki´nhma) and New Democracy (ND; N1´a
Dhmokrati´a), which was in power from November 2011 to May 2012, may have
blurred the distinction between incumbent and opposition parties; therefore, the
comparison between Greece and Portugal also allows us to examine the impact the
‘clarity of responsibility’may exert on candidate strategies, especially when it is difficult
to find someone to blame for painful austerity measures.
South European Society and Politics 547
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Data and Methods
This article aims to assess the degree of individualised campaigns in both Greece and
Portugal before and after the onset of the economic crisis. In order to address this
question, we use an original dataset based on a common questionnaire fielded in both
countries in two distinct elections. The analysis will proceed in two steps: first, we will
use the Comparative Candidate Study dataset (see the introduction to this special issue
for more details) to examine the variation of individualised campaigns across the two
countries; second, we will run a multivariate model in order to disentangle the main
determinants of campaign individualisation in four different contextual settings.
This article focuses only on the candidates from the two most important political
parties at the time of the elections: the Socialist Party (PS; Partido Socialista) and the Social
Democratic Party (PSD; Partido Social Democrata) in Portugal, and ND and PASOK in
Greece. We do this for both substantial and methodological reasons. First, we are
particularly interested in the behaviour of candidates and parties that have recently been in
government and/or that have greater chances of forming cabinets after the elections.
Second, some of the most important factors of campaign individualisation are probably
concerned with party characteristics such as party type (catch-all versus ideologically
grounded, large versus small in electoral terms, right versus left). Candidates fromminor
parties usually have quite different opinions and habits in terms of campaign
individualisation (due to both lack of resources and a stronger focus on ideology and
programmatic contents; see Gibson & Ro¨mmele 2001). For these reasons we believe the
impact of the financial crisis on campaign strategies should be limited formore ideological
or anti-system parties.When dealing with fairly similar parties, such as the PS and PSD in
Portugal and PASOKandND in Greece, most of the factors described above either do not
vary or present limited ranges. Therefore, by selecting only the least ideologically grounded
and largest parties, we naturally control for the impact of party characteristics on
campaign individualisation. Third, there are no data for Greek candidates in 2009
supported by parties other than ND and PASOK, which means that establishing a
comparison between the Greek campaign of 2009 and the other three campaigns without
acknowledging this important shortcoming would result in a series of imprecise findings.
Focusing the paper on the two largest parties in each country does not strike us as a major
problem, since the main goal of this article is to compare the general patterns of
individualisation and the relative strength of a set of relevant factors and determine if they
vary according to the political-institutional (Greece versus Portugal) or economic (pre
versus post-bailouts) contexts, rather than proposing a powerful model explaining a
considerable amount of the variation in the individualisation of candidate campaigns.
Inspired by Zittel and Gschwend (2008), we selected as dependent variables three
different dimensions of the individualisation of campaigns: the communicative focus of
the campaign (parties versus candidates, varying between zero, ‘Campaign is aimed to
attract as much attention as possible to the party’, and ten, ‘Campaign is aimed to attract
asmuch attention as possible to the candidate’), the campaign agenda (a dummy variable
depicting the inclusion of issues that are relevant to the constituency in the campaign)
548 M. Lisi and J. Santana-Pereira
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and the campaignmeans (varying between zero, ‘nopersonal resources or strategies used’,
and seven, ‘several personal resources or strategies used’).
The key factors in the empirical analysis are country (Portugal versus Greece),
campaign timing (before versus after the bailout) and the status of the party supporting
the candidates at the time of the election (one ¼ incumbent, zero ¼ opposition).1 The
control variables used in the models cover important socio-demographic characteristics
such as age and gender (see Aalberg & Stro¨mba¨ck 2011; Karlsen & Skogerbø 2013), but
also the level at which the candidate nomination was made (three-point scale, ranging
from local to national nomination), since decentralised nomination processes lead to
more individualisation (Carey & Shugart 1995; Giebler &Wessels 2013).2 Ideology is not
statistically controlled in the regressionmodels, since in our data framework it is strongly
associated with party status (incumbent versus opposition).
In the following section, we proceed with the description of the differences and
similarities between Greece and Portugal in terms of the three dimensions of candidate
individualisation. Then the relative contribution of each of the independent variables
described above is addressed by means of several regressions.
Campaign Individualisation in Portugal and Greece: Empirical Findings
Before focusing on the actual aspects of campaign individualisation – namely the
preparation and use of personalised materials – we begin by focusing on the norm
regarding the communicative focus of the campaigns. In other words, should
campaigns be used to call attention to the political parties or to the candidates? Greek
candidates tend to think more about using their campaigns to focus voter attention on
themselves than do Portuguese candidates (Table 1). The differences between the two
countries are paramount, and achieve statistical significance both before (t-test:
t[185] ¼ 24.68; p , 0.01) and after the bailouts (t-test: t[220] ¼ 25.51; p , 0.01).
In longitudinal terms, we see that in Greece and Portugal there was no significant shift
in the candidates’ communicative focus in 2009 and 2011–12, even if in the case of the
Table 1 Campaign Communicative Focus, Agenda and Resources in Portugal and Greece
before and after the Bailout (PS, PSD, PASOK and ND Candidates)
Portugal 2009 Portugal 2011 Greece 2009 Greece 2012
Communicative focus* 2.2 2.3 4.1 4.7
Campaign agenda (%)† 53.9 35 62 59.9
Personalisation of
campaign means (index)‡
2.2 2.1 4.5 4.3
Source: For Greece: Andreadis, Chadjipadelis and Teperoglou (2014a, 2014b); for Portugal: Freire and
Viegas (2010) and Freire, Viegas and Lisi (2013). Data calculated by the authors.
Notes: *TheThe values are mean (for each election) on a scale from zero (attract as much attention as
possible for my party) to ten (attract as much attention as possible for me).†Percentage of candidates
raising constituency-specific issues in the campaign.‡The values are mean (for each election) on a
scale from zero (no personal means used) to seven (all personal means used).
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Greek candidates the trend is upward (Portugal’s t-test: t[135] ¼ 21.36; p . 0.1;
Greece’s t-test ¼ t[270] ¼ 21.54; p . 0.1).
A second indicator of individualised campaigns concerns the campaign agenda.
The interviewees were asked if they raised constituency-specific issues during their
campaign, covering issues the party was not tackling at the national or regional levels.
Such behaviour is an indicator of individualisation because it detaches the prospective
deputies from the national agenda, and allows them to select issues and events in
which their own personality, experience or expertise may provide added value in the
contest. Once again, Greek candidates tend to adopt this strategy of individualisation
more often than Portuguese (Table 1), but the differences are significant only in the
most recent election (Chi-square 2009: x 2 [1, N ¼ 184] ¼ 1.20, p . 0.1; chi-square
2011/12: x 2 [1, N ¼ 222] ¼ 10.88, p . 0.01). In Greece, approximately 60 per cent of
candidates focused on district-specific issues in both campaigns, while in Portugal a
local agenda was implemented by about 35 per cent of the PS and PSD candidates in
2011 – a difference compared with 2009 of almost 20 percentage points (x 2 [1,
N ¼ 136] ¼ 4.85, p , 0.05). In Portugal, the post-bailout political context led PS and
PSD candidates to adopt independent agendas less often than in 2009 (Table 1).
Let us now focus on the resources and materials used by candidates during the
campaign. The majority of Portuguese and Greek candidates from the two main
political parties at the time of the election used at least one of the following personal
campaign materials and activities: personal posters, personal adverts in the local press,
office hours, social gatherings, personal flyers, personal media spots and a personal
website (Figure 1). In this article, we understand social gatherings and office hours to
be individualised campaign activities because they allow candidates to put themselves
at the centre of the campaign, and allow the voter to deal directly with them.
Social gatherings are the most common personalised activities carried out by
candidates in both Portugal and Greece, and their importance was not substantially
changed following the bailouts. Regarding the other six strategies, a comparative
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Figure 1 Specific Campaign Means Used by Candidates (%)
Source: See Table 1. Data calculated by the authors.
Note: Percentage of candidates who mentioned using the specific campaign mean.
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analysis suggests the use of the media (local newspapers, broadcasters, the Internet) is
much more common in Greece than in Portugal, as is the preparation of personal
flyers and the habit of establishing office hours to receive voters. In longitudinal terms,
there is a great degree of stability between the campaigns of 2009 and 2011–12, even
though use of the Internet increased considerably in Portugal, while newspaper adverts
and office hours were implemented as campaign strategies by a smaller proportion of
Portuguese candidates. Also, in Portugal, less than 40 per cent of the candidates used a
personal web page in their campaign, the Portuguese figures being substantially lower
than those found in Greece (Figure 1).
The data discussed above were used in the creation of an index of personalisation of
the campaign means, varying between zero (if no personalised means were used) and
seven (if all the personal means were implemented in the campaign). It is no surprise
that Greek candidates used, on average, around four out of seven individualised
campaign means, while the average for the Portuguese candidates was around two in
both the 2009 and the 2011 elections. In Greece, personal means were used more often
than in Portugal both before (t-test: t[176] ¼ 210.65; p , 0.01) and after the bailout
(t-test: t[217] ¼ 29.50; p , 0.01). Finally, we found strong patterns of within-
country stability in the campaigns conducted by candidates from the two larger
political parties before and after the bailouts (Table 1).
In summary, the analysis above suggests that, with few exceptions, there has been a
considerable degree of stability in the way candidates supported by the main parties
conducted their campaigns before and after the crisis. The data also suggest that levels
of campaign individualisation were often much greater in Greece than in Portugal.
This empirical evidence does not allow us to support our first hypothesis, concerning
the effects of the crisis, but our second hypothesis, concerning the differences between
Portugal and Greece, is confirmed.
Factors of Campaign Individualisation in Portugal and Greece, before and
after the Bailout
In the previous section, we saw that the bailout context seems not to have caused
significant changes in the degree to which candidates supported by the two most
important parties in each country personalised their campaigns, and that there were
significant differences between the Portuguese and the Greek campaigns. In this
section, we aim to strengthen that conclusion by means of an individual-level analysis,
as well as aiming to assess whether there was a shift in the factors explaining campaign
individualisation before and after the bailout. After 2009 we expect the impact of
contextual variables (that is, the status of the supporting party as incumbent or
opposition) to be greater with respect to other factors.
For each dependent variable, four regression models are presented. Model 1 is a
general model for Portugal and Greece, which includes the control variables and a
dummy for country in order to assess the importance of the institutional setting in the
patterns of campaign individualisation. Model 2 also includes a dummy for the year of
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election and an interaction term aiming to test whether the impact of the economic
crisis was indeed greater in Greece than in Portugal. Models 3 and 4 are country
specific and designed to assess the impact of the financial crisis and the attitudes and
behaviour of candidates supported by the incumbent parties within each country.
The first set of regressions takes the communicative focus of the campaign as the
dependent variable (Table 2). The results support the conclusions derived from
the country-level analysis: the differences between Portuguese and Greek candidates
are paramount even when we control for several other factors, which means they are
probably due to differences in the institutional arrangements in these two countries.
Also, the bailouts do not seem to have caused substantial differences in the normative
focus of the campaigns in Portugal or Greece. Finally, replicating the results from
several other studies (Aalberg & Stro¨mba¨ck 2011; Karlsen & Skogerbø 2013), female
candidates are less prone to expressing the idea the campaigns should focus on them
instead of on the parties supporting them.
Let us now focus on specific country models. In Portugal, aside from gender, only the
interaction between election year and party status is statistically significant; but it
unexpectedly assumes a negative value (Table 2). This means that in Portugal candidates
from the incumbent party display lower levels of normative campaign individualisation
after the bailout. Interestingly enough, the incumbent party and the party leader in 2009
and 2011, were the same – the PS and Jose´ So´crates. However, the status with respect to
the government only becomes significant in the differentiation between PS and PSD
candidates in 2011.Apossible explanation for this is that in 2011PS candidatesweremore
left-wing (and therefore less prone to personalisation compared with PSD candidates)
Table 2 Linear Regression Models: Personalisation of the Campaign’s Communicative
Focus
Model 1 (all) Model 2 (all) Model 3 (Portugal) Model 4 (Greece)
Intercept 5.21*** (1.01) 5.05*** (1.13) 2.22** (0.97) 6.34*** (1.24)
Gender (F.) 21.59*** (0.38) 21.57*** (0.38) 21.71*** (0.44) 21.30** (0.43)
Age 20.01 (0.02) 20.01 (0.02) 20.01 (0.02) 20.03 (0.02)
Level of nomination 20.23 (0.19) 20.20 (0.19) 20.08 (0.19) 20.22 (0.22)
Greece 2.61*** (0.35) 2.41*** (0.52)
Year (after bailout) 0.23 (0.50) 0.78 (0.50) 1.01 (0.64)
Country £ Year 0.25 (0.71)
Status (incumbent) 0.45 (0.56) 1.08* (0.63)
Year £ Status 21.84* (0.07) 21.05 (0.85)
R2 (%) 23.3 23.7 16.2 7.3
N 326 326 119 215
Source: See Table 1.
Notes: Dependent variable varies from zero (attention focused on parties) to ten (attention focused
on candidates). Non-standardised coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. In the first two
models, weights were used in order to balance the proportion of Portuguese and Greek candidates
included in the analysis. The proportions of candidates interviewed before and after the bailouts are
similar. ***p , 0.001; **p , 0.05; *p , 0.10.
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than in 2009. This hypothesis is not confirmed by the data, since although in 2011 the PS
indeed became less and the PSD more prone to personalisation, the average ideological
position of PS and PSD candidates remained virtually unchanged (3.1 and 5.9,
respectively, in 2009; 3.3 and 6.1, respectively, in 2011).
In the case of Greece the pattern is different (Table 2). In 2009 the dummy variable
‘Year’ was zero and candidates from the incumbent party showed a greater tendency
towards focusing the campaign on their own personalities than opposition party
candidates. Contrary to our expectations, the interaction term between election year
and party status is not statistically significant, which means party status had no impact
on the level of normative campaign individualisation after the bailout. Considering
that between 2009 and 2012 there was a slight, statistically insignificant, increase in the
average normative individualisation of campaigns in Greece, these patterns may have
more to do with the adoption of a different position by PASOK candidates, who were
more favourable to focusing on the candidate instead of the party in 2012, and slightly
less left-wing than in 2009 (3.8 and 3.1, respectively, on an 11-point scale in which ten
means ‘right’). Finally, the effect of gender is significant and in the expected direction.
The next set of logistic regressions tests the impact of our model on the probability
of having raised a constituency-specific issue during the campaign. Models 1 and 2
show that the factors being analysed do not explain a great amount of the variation in
this dependent variable (Table 3). The weak differences identified between Portugal
and Greece are not significant before the bailout elections, that is, when the dummy
‘Year’ is kept at the value zero in Model 2. Model 2 shows that there are significant
differences before and after the bailout in Portugal (that is, when the dummy ‘Greece’
is held constant at the value zero), in that candidates were less prone to addressing
local issues in 2011.
Table 3 Logistic Regression Models: Personalisation of the Campaign’s Agenda
Model 1 (all) Model 2 (all) Model 3 (Portugal) Model 4 (Greece)
Intercept 20.44 (0.86) 20.16 (0.89) 20.60 (0.97) 20.86 (0.87)
Gender (F.) 20.42 (0.30) 20.42 (0.30) 20.47 (0.45) 20.42 (0.30)
Age 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.02 (0.02) 0.02 (0.01)
Level of nomination 0.21 (0.15) 0.20 (0.15) 0.13 (0.22) 0.29* (0.15)
Greece 0.54* (0.28) 0.27 (0.40)
Year (after bailout) 20.68* (0.40) 20.68 (0.50) 0.55 (0.45)
Country £ Year 0.62 (0.57)
Status (incumbent) 20.10 (0.55) 1.10** (0.46)
Year £ Status 20.01 (0.82) 21.20* (0.61)
Nagelkerke R2 (%) 5.6 7.3 7.7 6.9
N 326 326 110 216
Source: See Table 1.
Notes: Dependent variable varies between zero (no constituency-specific issues raised) and one
(constituency-specific issues raised). Non-standardised coefficients with standard errors in
parentheses. In the first two models, weights were used in order to balance the proportion of
Portuguese and Greek candidates included in the analysis. The proportions of candidates interviewed
before and after the bailouts are similar. ***p , 0.001; **p , 0.05; *p , 0.10.
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The results of Model 3 show that our set of independent variables is not successful in
explaining variation in the focus of campaign agendas in Portugal (Table 3). Even the
effect of the bailout, which has been identified in the country-level analysis and in
Model 2, disappears, not achieving statistical significance when several controls are
included and the number of cases in the analysis is reduced. In Greece, beyond
nomination level, the status of the party is important in 2009 (when the dummy ‘Year’
is kept at the value zero): members of the incumbent party were more likely to develop
an independent campaign agenda than members of PASOK. The interaction term
between incumbent and year of election is also significant, but in an unexpected way: it
seems incumbent-supported candidates focused less on local topics after the bailout
than before (Table 3).
The followingmodels dealwith campaign individualisation in terms of themeans used
(Table 4). Once again, Models 1 and 2 show there were no significant changes before and
after the bailouts in Portugal andGreece, and that, all others things being equal, theGreek
setting fosters personalisation of resources to a greater extent than the Portuguese. Also,
and quite surprisingly, the level of nomination has a significant effect on the number of
individualised resources used: the more centralised the level of nomination, the more
individualised the resources used. This may be so for four reasons: first, candidates
nominated at the national levelmay have easier access to the financial resources necessary
to implement individualised campaigns; second, they may be part of the party elite, and
therefore their personality and other individual characteristics may be considered an
added value in the campaign; third, candidates nominated at the national level may have
weaker links with the constituency, and the individualisation of their campaign resources
may be a strategy to create stronger bonds between external candidates and local voters;
Table 4 Linear Regression Models: Personalisation of the Means Used in the Campaign
Model 1 (all) Model 2 (all) Model 3 (Portugal) Model 4 (Greece)
Intercept 2.82*** (0.63) 2.89*** (0.65) 3.36*** (0.70) 3.87*** (0.61)
Gender (F.) 20.24 (0.22) 20.24 (0.22) 20.50 (0.32) 20.07 (0.21)
Age 20.02 (0.01) 20.02 (0.01) 20.03** (0.01) 20.03 (0.01)
Level of nomination 0.20* (0.11) 0.20* (0.11) 0.20 (0.15) 0.21** (0.11)
Greece 2.17*** (0.20) 2.17*** (0.30)
Year (after bailout) 20.11 (0.29) 0.08 (0.35) 0.38 (0.32)
Country £ Year 0.01 (0.40)
Status (incumbent) 20.35 (0.39) 0.47 (0.31)
Year £ Status 20.40 (0.56) 20.81* (0.42)
R2 (%) 38.2 38.3 12.1 3.7
N 317 317 101 215
Source: See Table 1.
Notes: Dependent variable varies from zero (no personal means used) to seven (all personal means
used). Non-standardised coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. In the first two models,
weights were used in order to balance the proportion of Portuguese and Greek candidates included
in the analysis. The proportions of candidates interviewed before and after the bailouts are similar.
***p , 0.001; **p , 0.05; *p , 0.10.
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fourth, the national party leadership may decide to select candidates with greater
resources and more political visibility.
The country model does a poor job in the case of Portugal, since the only important
factor seems to be the age of the candidate: younger candidates used individualised
means more often than older ones (Table 4). In Greece, the interaction between
election year and party status displays a statistically significant negative coefficient.
Therefore, it seems that candidates supported by the incumbent party used fewer
individualised means after the bailout than they did before. Unlike in Greece, the
impact of nomination level does not achieve statistical significance in Portugal.
Conclusions
This article sought to shed some light on the potential effects of the economic crisis in
campaign strategies implemented by candidates supported by the main political
parties in Portugal and Greece. By and large, we could not confirm that the massive
austerity policies implemented since 2008 have had a powerful impact on campaign
strategies in Greece or Portugal. With regard to communicative focus and campaign
means, the degree of individualisation has remained unchanged during the post-crisis
period. The only important effect deals with the emphasis candidates give to local
issues in Portugal. Overall, these findings indicate that the effects of the economic
crisis on campaign style are very hard to see, and may have more to do with specific
political parties (as we will see below). Therefore, our first hypothesis does not receive
empirical support. One reason for this pattern of continuity may be associated with
the nature of the electoral process. As Papathanassopoulos has noted (2000, p. 58),
‘voters choose between different political parties and not between individual
candidates’, a situation that we can find in both countries. Moreover, despite the
decline of partisan identities after the crisis, a great proportion of voters in both Greece
and Portugal still use partisan cues for their voting choice. Finally, the high degree of
centralisation of party organisations may also foster continuity in the way campaigns
are organised, regardless of the specificities of the context. As several studies suggest
(Demertzis et al. 2005; Seiceira 2011), even after the technological change made
available by internet, political parties tend to reproduce old models of electioneering.
This means that campaign characteristics display a high degree of resilience to external
changes or constraints. Having said this, however, we would sound a note of caution
because this research deals with the immediate consequences of the financial crisis on
campaign strategies. It remains to be seen what changes the economic crisis will
produce in the future. In other words, it is too early to say how and by how much the
crisis contributed in altering the way parties and candidates campaign.
As far as the institutional impact is concerned, our hypothesis was that Greek
candidates were more prone to displaying greater levels of campaign individualisation.
Several indicators are used to test this assumption, and most of them display patterns
supporting the idea that candidate individualisation is more common in Greece than
in Portugal: this is noticeable with respect to the norms of the communicative focus,
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the adoption of an individualised or localised agenda and the use of personalised
campaign tools.
Our third hypothesis, concerning greater levels of individualisation by candidates
from incumbent parties following the bailout, receives no support at all. First, in terms
of communicative focus on the campaigns, a shift was observed among incumbent
candidates in Portugal towards less personalised campaigns. In the case of Greece,
there was a trend towards higher levels of individualisation after the bailout, even if the
differences between the two campaigns are not statistically significant. This trend is
essentially due to a shift in the position of incumbent candidates in 2012, who moved
closer to (and became indistinguishable from) ND in terms of campaign focus norms.
Second, in terms of campaign agendas, the differentiation between incumbent and
opposition parties is important only in the 2009 Greek election campaign – before the
bailout – whereas after the bailout candidates supported by the incumbent actually
focused less on constituency-specific topics. Third, in Greece incumbents behaved
differently after the bailout, using less individualised campaign tools. This is probably
due not to the political context but rather to the nature of the incumbent party. In this
case, PASOK decided to adopt a mixed strategy: their candidates were more likely to
focus the campaign on themselves than in 2009, but they did not invest in more
individualised means – perhaps because they lacked the funds to do so. It is also
interesting to note that, in general, right-wing parties seem to adopt more
individualised campaigns than left-wing parties, at least at the normative level, but this
difference is contingent and depends more on context than on ideological positions.
The strategies of the incumbent parties therefore seem to be different in Portugal
and Greece after the bailout. In Portugal, the PS probably thought the best strategy was
to use the image of the party and of its leader instead of granting its local candidates
more freedom and space, even if the incumbent prime minister and the party as a
whole were being blamed for the economic situation and, therefore, a resounding
electoral defeat was expected (Magalha˜es 2014). In Greece, financial constraints and
the grand coalition between PASOK and ND may have blurred the differences in
campaign strategies and no clear trend for the incumbent emerged either before or
after the bailout. Further research is needed to examine more deeply the impact of
accountability mechanisms (or lack thereof) on campaign strategies and candidate
personalisation, as well as on the differences between left- and right-wing parties.
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Notes
1. We consider PASOK the incumbent party for two reasons: it was responsible for the bailout, and
the grand coalition with ND lasted only a few months.
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2. According to the data, the proportion of candidates elected in the most recent election was higher
in Portugal than in Greece (31.7 per cent and 17.8 per cent, respectively, in the 2009 elections).
In Portugal this proportion increased to 39.4 per cent of elected candidates in the 2011 elections;
no data are available for the Greek case. We believe that this difference does not substantially alter
the interpretation of the main results, as both countries use list systems which encourage
candidates to improve the overall performance of the party.
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